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was also seen to be unfair. It could not be justified in terms of 
the limitation clause, since the aim of the provincial 
government to reduce unemployment among South African 
teachers at the expense of permanent residents would be 
illegitimate (Larbi-Odam decision, para. 31).
Although the outcome of the decision is to be welcomed, one 
might ask what the fate of the permanent residents would have 
been, had they not been perceived as a vulnerable group whose 
fundamental dignity might be at stake. Had they not passed this 
hurdle, the impact of the regulation on their interests and the 
idiosyncrasy of granting people permanent residency and then 
excluding them from the employment market, might not have 
been considered at all.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the main criticism against the historical 
interpretation followed by the court is that it results in a very 
restrictive concept of equality. Only those categories of persons 
who would qualify as a vulnerable group, or whose fundamental
Hong Kong
dignity could be affected by the discriminatory measures, have a 
realistic chance of succeeding with a claim of unfair 
discrimination. It seems that the court assumes that treating lesso
severe forms of discrimination as 'unfair discrimination' might 
trivialise the severity of the humiliating discrimination suffered 
by the country's black population in the past. Consequently, 
many patterns of less severe but nonetheless unfair treatment 
would be excluded from the protection provided by the equality- 
clause, unless the court develops artificial constructions of 
vulnerable groups, or artificial connections between 
discriminatory measures and the fundamental dignity of those 
affected. The court would be well advised to reconsider this 
interpretation, if it is truly committed to providing extensive 
equal treatment to the members of the South African society. @
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Does legal set-off exist?
by Eugene Fung
I n Re Finbo Engineering Co Ltd (unreported), 18 March 1998, Le Pichon J, the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong was asked whether legal set-off exists in Hong Kong. A petition 
was filed to wind up a company on the ground that it was unable 
to pay its debts and that it was just and equitable that it should 
be wound up. The petition was opposed by the company on the 
ground that it was entitled to a set-off against the debt owed to 
the petitioner.
If the company could show an arguable defence of legal 
set-off, the petition would have to be dismissed. Le Pichon J 
concluded that, given the complexity of the question, the 
company must at least have an arguable defence of legal set-off.
ORIGINS OF LEGAL SET-OFF
A 'set-off has been defined as 'the setting of cross-claims 
against each other to produce a balance' (see R Derham, Set-Off, 
2nd ed, (1996), Oxford, p. 1). Legal set-off has a statutory 
origin: the statutes of set-off were enacted in England in 1729 
and 1735 ('the statutes of set-off). Before the passing of the 
statutes of set-off, a debtor had to bring a separate action in 
order to enforce a debt owed to him by his creditor.
The statutes of set-off were designed to prevent the 
imprisonment as a debtor of a person not truly indebted 
because there was a mutual debt owing by his creditor. The plea 
of set-off under the statutes was available where each of the 
demands sounded in damages and was 'capable of being 
liquidated, or ascertained with precision at the time of 
pleading'(Tindal CJ in Morley v Inglis (1837) 4 Bing (NC) 58 at 
p. 71). (Recently, in Stein v Blake [1996] 1 AC 243 at p. 251, 
Lord Hoffmann similarly said that the 'legal set-off is confined 
to debts which at the time when the defence of set-off is filed 
were due and payable and either liquidated or in sums capable 
of ascertainment without valuation or estimation.')
Moreover, the debtor did not have to bring his cross-claim in 
a separate action. Thus, as Willes CJ thought, the statutes of 
set-off were intended to avoid circuit)' of action (Hutchinson v 
Sturges (1741) Willes 261 at p. 262).
The Supreme Court of Judicature in England was established 
by \hejudicature Act 1873, which expressly allowed the court to 
entertain a counterclaim (s. 24, rule 3). It therefore appears that 
the passing of the Judicature Act 1873 rendered the statutes of 
set-off redundant. Accordingly, the statues of set-off were 
repealed by s. 2 of Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879 and the 
Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883. In each of the 
repealing statutes, there were savings to ensure that the repeal 
would not affect any jurisdiction, principle or rule of law or 
equity which had been established or confirmed by or under 
either of the enactments (Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879, 
s. 4(1 )(b) and the preamble of the Statute Law Revision and Civil 
Procedure Act 1883). The saving provisions have been interpreted 
as preserving the right of set-off originally conferred by the 
statutes of set-off (e.g. Hanak v Green [1958] 2 QB 9 at p. 22 
where Morris LJ said that 'the Judicature Acts conferred no new 
rights of set-off ). It follows that the right to a legal set-off under 
the statutes of set-off had come to be regarded as part of the 
common law of England and Wales at the time when the statutes 
of set-off were repealed.
LEGAL SET-OFF IN HONG KONG
The Supreme Court of Judicature at Hong Kong was 
established by Ordinance No. 15 of 1844 ('the 1884 
Ordinance'). Section 3 of the 1884 Ordinance reads:
'And be it further enacted and ordained, That the Law of England 
shall be in full Force in the said Colony of Hong Kong, except where 
the same shall be inapplicable to the local Circumstances of the said 
Colony, or its Inhabitants: ... Provided also, that in all Matters relating 
to the Practice and Proceedings of the said Supreme Court... the Practice 
of the English Courts shall be in Force, until otherwise ordered by any 
Rule of the said Court. ..'
Le Pichon J said in her judgment that:
'local circumstances would not have made the statutes [of set-off] 
inapplicable or subject to modification. '
Although the 1884 Ordinance was subsequently amended 
several times, the application of the statutes of set-off was not 31
affected. In the present case, it was argued by the petitioner that 
legal set-off was not applicable in Hong Kong because the 
statutes of set-off were not listed in the schedule to the 
Application of English Law Ordinance (No. 2 of 1966) 
('AELO'). (The AELO was to declare the extent to which English 
law was in force in Hong Kong; see generally P Wesley-Smith, 
The Sources of Hong Kong Law, (1994), Hong Kong, p. 91 95.) 
The AEEO provided, inter alia:
  for the common law and the rules of equity to be enforced in 
Hong Kong so far as applicable and subject to any necessary 
modifications (s. 3);
  for certain English Acts as listed in the schedule to the 
Ordinance to apply to Hong Kong subject to such 
modifications as local circumstances warranted (s. 4).
Neither the statutes of set-off nor the 1879 and 1883 Acts 
have ever been listed in the schedule to the AELO. It was 
accepted by the petitioner that legal set-off was part of the law 
of Hong Kong for over 120 years (i.e. from 1844   1966). 
However, as a result of the passing of the AELO which excluded 
any English statues on legal set-off, it was argued that the 
doctrine of legal set-off was thereby abolished.
O J
Le Pichon J did not decide on this question. Her Ladyship 
rightly pointed out that:
'it is wholly inappropriate to determine such an important question 
(viz. whether legal set-off was abolished by the AELO) in the context of 
an application to stay or dismiss winding-up proceedings. For present 
purposes, suffice to say that this question admits of no easy answer. So 
at a minimum, Einbo [the company] must at least have an arguable 
defence based on legal set-off, the existence oj such right raising 'a 
serious question'.
LEGAL SET-OFF NEVER ABOLISHED
It is submitted that legal set-off has existed in Hong Kong 
since 1884 and was never abolished by the AELO in 1966. 
When the 1844 Ordinance was enacted in Hong Kong, it waso o'
the practice and procedure of the English courts to allow claims 
of legal set-off as a defence. Such English practice was firmly 
established as part of the Hong Kong practice and procedure 
through the various Supreme Court Ordinances enacted 
between 1844 and 1937 (see s. 4 of the 1845 Ordinance, s. 3 
of the 1846 Ordinance, s. 5 and 6 of the 1873 Ordinance and 
item 17(1) of the schedule to the 1937 Ordinance). Hence, up 
to 1966 before the enactment of the AELO, it is clear that legal 
set-off has been in existence in Hong Kong.
Section 7 of the AELO amended the previous Supreme Court 
Ordinance to read as follows:
'Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the practice of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature of England for the time being in force 
therein shall be in force in the court. '
Accordingly, if legal set-off was firmly established as a matter 
of procedure both in England and Hong Kong before 1966, it 
would have clearly survived after the enactment of the AELO in 
1966. It was unnecessary for the AELO to include any English 
statutes on legal set-off in its schedule. In fact, it would have 
been odd if the AELO had made the statutes of set-off applicable 
to Hong Kong because the statutes of set-off were simply no 
longer applicable in England in 1966.
The applicability of legal set-off in Hong Kong after 1966 is 
also clear. Section 17 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1975 
again confirmed the position of legal set-off in Hong Kong. The 
relevant provision in the current Supreme Court Ordinance is 
s. 16(2)(b) (substituted pursuant to s. 11 Supreme Court 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1987, commencing 10 July 1987. The 
wording of this section has the similar effect as s. 49 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981). The effect of s. 16(2)(b) is simply to
preserve the right to plead legal set-off in so far as the same was 
created and governed by the ordinances stretching from 
1844 1987. It is submitted that legal set-off has been preserved 
by the various Supreme Court Ordinances. It could not have 
been abolished by the AELO in 1966 because the doctrine of 
legal set-off is a procedural defence, as opposed to being a 
substantive defence.
DEFENCE OF LEGAL SET-OFF
A substantive defence destroys the validity of the plaintiff 's 
claim:
'either by requiring that the facts necessary to be proved in order to 
give rise to the claimed legal liability should be proved to the 
appropriate standard, or by showing that the facts (if proved) would not 
attract that liability.' (G Burton, 'Set-off, The Principles of Equity, 
ed P Parkmson, (1996), Sydney, 971 at p. 974)
On the other hand, a procedural defence only has effect until 
judgment.
The defence of set-off is clearly more akin to a procedural 
defence. The plaintiff's debt and the defendant's cross-claim 
remain distinct unless and until there is judgment for a set-off. 
In relation to legal set-off, it is submitted that it is a procedural 
defence (see Derham, who is of the view that the right of set-off 
derived from the statutes of set-off is not purely procedural 
because it can have a substantive effect upon the rights and 
interests of third parties). When legal set-off is pleaded as a 
defence, it amounts to an admission that the defendant is 
entitled to set off his cross-claim in reduction* or extinction of 
the amount for which the plaintiff is entitled to judgment (see 
R Goode, Legal Problems oj Credit and Security, 2nd ed, (1988), 
p. 1 39, and Burton, 97 1 at p. 982). It has further been said that:
'[Set-off] is part of the law oj procedure which enables a debtor in an 
action brought against him by his creditor to raise as a defence a 
cross-debt or liquidated demand. But a set-off is not a denial of the 
debt   it is a plea against its enforcement. It is in substance a plea in 
bar. It differs in substance from a plea of payment or accord and 
satisfaction which in effect alleges that the claim no longer exists. A plea 
of set-ojf, on the other hand, in effect admits the existence of the debt, 
but sets up a cross-claim as being a ground on which the person 
against whom the claim is brought is excused from payment and 
entitled to judgment on the plaintiff's claim. ' (O'Bryan J in Re K L 
Tractors Ltd [f 954] VLR 505 at p. 507; see also Stehar Knitting 
Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd (1980) 2 NSWLR 
514 at 517 E-F, 518 F-G).
Accordingly, the set-off crystallises at the time of judgment 
and the plaintiff's claim is not reduced or extinguished until that 
time (Re Hiram Maxim Lamp Company (1903) 1 Ch 70).
It is also important to bear in mind the purpose for which the 
defence of legal set-off was created. As stated earlier, the statutes 
of set-off were designed to avoid circuity of action (see 
Hutchinson case), which is entirely a matter of procedure. 
Moreover, when the statutes of set-off were repealed in 1879 
and 1883 in England, the very title of the repealing statutes 
suggested that at that stage, the legislature viewed legal set-off as 
a rule of procedure (S McCracken, The Banker's Remedy of Set-off 
(1993), London, p. 57). (See especially the preamble to Civil 
Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879 which referred to 'certain 
enactments which relate to civil procedure or matters connected 
therewith'.)
Accordingly, being a procedural defence, legal set-off has been 
preserved by the various Supreme Court Ordinances and is alive 
and well in Hong Kong. ©
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